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CODIFICATION TECHNIQUE AND THE PROBLEM
OF IMPERATIVE AND SUPPLETIVE LAWS
Alejandro M. Ga~ro*
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between "imperative" and "suppletive" laws is
an ancient one in the civil law tradition. Roman legal literature
distinguished between rules of jus cogens, which could not be
derogated from by the parties, and jus dispositivum, which could be
set aside by contrary agreement.' Most of the modern civil codes, in
turn, assume as their basic principle the autonomy of the will, a notion
derived from the conceptions of the school of natural law, whereby
men should be as free as possible in the regulation of their activities
and in the determination of their rights and obligations toward
others.2 Hence, all that the law does not command nor prohibit is
abandoned to the free will of the parties and is permitted. The prin-
ciple of autonomy of the will has been characterized as one of the
cornerstones of the Louisiana civilian tradition.'
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The author wishes to
express his appreciation for the assistance of the Louisiana State Law Institute in the
preparation of this article.
1. See R. SOHM, L. MITTEIS & L. WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN. GESCHICHTE UND
SYSTEM DES ROMISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 24 (17th ed. 1923).
2. See R. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 34-35 (4th ed. 1928).
See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 6: "Individuals cannot by their conventions derogate from
the force of laws made for the preservation of public order and good morals." Swiss
CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 19: "Within the limits of the law, the parties may determine
the terms of their contract as they please. Contract terms at variance with provisions
of law are permissible unless they are inconsistent with a mandatory provision, contra
bonos mores or in violation of the public order or the right of personality." Swiss Civ.
CODE art. 27: "No one can renounce his freedom or restrict himself in its use in a
degree offensive to law or morality." ITALIAN CIV. CODE art. 31: "Notwithstanding the
provisions of the preceding articles, in no case can the laws and acts of a foreign state,
the rules and acts of any institution or entity, or private provisions and agreements be
effective within the territory of the State, when they are contrary to public policy or
morals." MEXICAN CIV. CODE (for the Federal District and Territories) art. 6: "The will
of private persons cannot exempt from the observance of the law, nor alter it nor
modify it. Private rights which do not directly affect the public interest may be waived
only when the waiver does not impair rights of third parties." See also AUSTRIAN CIV.
CODE art. 937; GREEK CIV. CODE art. 3; CHILEAN CIV. CODE art. 12; ARGENTINE CIV.
CODE arts. 19 & 21.
3. A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 140 (1971); S. LITVINOFF & W.
T9TE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 161 (1969).
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Article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code4 provides the legal
framework for the doctrinal distinction between imperative, or man-
datory, and suppletive laws. Although neither term is included in
the article, traditional civilian doctrine characterizes as imperative
those legal precepts rooted in public policy which may not be set
aside by private agreement. Suppletive laws, on the other hand, are
those legal norms designed to supplement the parties' will in cases
wherein its application is not excluded.' French legal doctrine refers
also to suppletive norms as interpretative laws [lois interpretatives],
See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws
on those who have formed them .... " LA. CIv. CODE art. 1764: "All things that are not
forbidden by law, may legally become the subject of, or the motive for contracts ..
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 11:
Ildividuals cannot by their conventions, derogate from the force of laws made for
the preservation of public order or good morals.
But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they can
renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the renunciation does
not affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to the public good.
5. Although this distinction is also known in common law jurisdictions, no
general common law doctrine has as yet developed to deal with this matter. See A.
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, at 73; David, The Distinction Between lois imperatives
and lois suppletives in Comparative Law, 22 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 154 (1952). The term
"suppletive" has given a hard time to the reporter of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, whose principal job is to catch errors in the Justices' opinions. In an
interview conducted by Professor Paul R. Baier of the Louisiana State University Law
Center, Henry Putzel, jr., who retired in February, 1979, as the thirteenth reporter of
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, described thus his encounter with the
term "suppletive":
[Olne day I was sitting in my office, and I got a note delivered by one of the
messengers in which Justice White asked me what the word "suppletive" meant,
as used in an opinion of Justice Harlan ... In my letter to Justice White I said:
After receiving your note from the bench . . . asking for the definition of sup-
pletive as used in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 540 (1971), certain smoldering
memories were sparked and I took a look at the original copy of the opinion with
our editorial suggestions to Mr. Justice Harlan. We had circled the word 'sup-
pletive' and asked is this word intended? The definitions in neither Webster's nor
the [Unabridged Oxford Dictionary) seemed to fit. The reply was 'stet'-leave it
as it is. After all these years our same observation holds. The definition in
Webster's II is this: 'Characterized or constituting an instance of 'suppletion' and
'suppletion' is defined as 'the occurrence of phonemically unrelated alimorphs of
the same morphene whether the morphene is a base of an affix.' Please tell me
what that means! ... [I] was amused at that because it was one instance in which
we had singled out the word, couldn't find out what it meant and either Justice
Harlan or his law clerk was satisfied that he knew what it meant, so there it was.
Now it may turn out to be a-although I must have looked it up in Black's Law
Dictionary, too, but I'm not sure-but it may be a civil law term or something of
that sort. I couldn't find out ....
P. BAIER, A Report on the Reporter: 'Double Revolving Peripatetic Nitpicker',
SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 10, 15 (1980).
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for the legislator interprets the will of the parties whenever their
silence allows the application of suppletive laws.'
The classification of laws as imperative or suppletive has been
confused at times with the categorization of laws as prohibitory and
permissive.7 In fact, both categories were devised in response to dif-
ferent legal problems. Article 12 of the Louisiana Civil Code speaks
of prohibitory laws,8 statutes which are to be distinguished from
permissive laws. Prohibitory laws are those norms cast in impera-
tive form but exhibiting a negative command, that is, prohibiting a
certain conduct. Permissive laws, by way of contrast, are norms
which prescribe a positive, rather than negative, conduct.' The class-
ification of prohibitory and permissive laws dates to the Corpus
Juris,'" was incorporated into article 9 of the Projet du Gouverna-
6. See A. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL. INTRODUCTION GENPRALE 107 (1973); B. STARCK, DROIT
CIVIL. INTRODUCTION 23 (1972); 1 F. JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIERE, DROIT CIVIL 19 (1965).
This terminology has been criticized by Marty and Raynaud, who state that the
lawmaker does not construe the will of the parties but simply commands what the par-
ties should do in case they have not provided their own rules. 1 G. MARTY & P.
RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL 162 (1956). Although suppletive laws may conform to the
presumed intent of the parties, this is not necessarily so. Thus, if the spouses do not
modify by contract the legal regime of community of acquets and gains, they will be
subject to the legal regime even though it can be established that they did not enter
into a matrimonial agreement because of a misunderstanding or lack of knowledge of
the rules governing the ownership and management of the property of married per-
sons. See 1 A. VON TUHR, DERECHO CIVIL TEORIA GENERAL DEL DERECHO CIVIL ALEMAN
41 (T. Rava Span. transl. 1946).
7. See Morrison, Legislative Technique and the Problem of Suppletive and Con-
structive Laws, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 544 (1935); R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE,
SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 83-92 (M. Kindred transl. 1972). Morrison characterizes
laws as constructive or suppletive, and subdivides the constructive laws into impera-
tive and prohibitory. David refers to prohibitory laws as synonymous of imperative
laws. See also E. L. Burns Co., Inc. v. Cashio, 302 So. 2d 297, 300 (La. 1974).
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 12: "Whatever is done in contravention of a prohibitory
law, is void, although the nullity be not formally directed."
9. Article 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code anticipates this distinction while stating
that the law "permits" and "forbids." See Badon's Employment, Inc. v. Smith, 359 So.
2d 1284, 1286 (La. 1978); E. L. Burns Co., Inc. v. Cashio, 302 So. 2d 297, 301 (La. 1974).
In E.L. Burns, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a contractual clause of a surety
bond providing a prescriptive term of two years was invalid because it contravened
article 3460 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The supreme court held that insofar as the
Public Works Act, LA. R.S. 38:2247 (Supp. 1962), established a one-year prescriptive
term in favor of the surety, a stipulation extending that term to two years amounts to
an anticipatory renunciation of a prescription not yet acquired, and, as such, is in viola-
tion of the prohibition of article 3460. The majority opinion considered article 3460 not
only a prohibitory law but also a rule vital to the public order.
10. Code, 1.14.5:
There is no doubt that he violates the law who, while obeying its letter attempts
to destroy its spirit, for he will not escape the legal penalties prescribed, if, con-
trary to the intention of the law, he frequently and fraudulently takes advantage of
its words; for We desire that no agreement, act, or convention shall take place
1981] 1009
LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
ment de l'an VIII, and later was eliminated from the final text of the
Code Napoleon as self-evident."
Article 12 of the Louisiana Civil Code addresses the problem of
tacit and express nullities, establishing the rule that whenever the
law forbids a certain conduct, even though the sanction to the viola-
tion is not expressed, nullity will follow.12 Legal provisions like the
ones prescribing that separation from bed and board "cannot be
made the subject of arbitration,"" that a married person "cannot
adopt without the consent of the other,"'" or that "one cannot re-
nounce a prescription not yet acquired"15 are examples of pro-
hibitory laws, the violation of which is sanctioned with nullity even
though the nullity is not expressly stated. It is not within the scope
of this article to deal with the question of tacit or implicit nullities,
but it should be borne in mind that imperative laws are not to be
identified with prohibitory laws, since neither the text of article 12
nor the relevant Roman texts support that interpretation. Whereas
public order is an element necessarily connected with imperative
statutes,"8 a prohibitory law is not necessarily a norm "made for the
between any contracting parties when the law forbids this to be done. We order
that this shall apply to all legal interpretations in general, whether they are old
or new, so that it will be sufficient for a legislator merely to have prohibited what
he did not wish to be done; and that it is permitted to ascertain other matters
from the intention of the law, just as if they had been expressed, that is to say,
that where anything is forbidden by law and is done, it shall not only be void, but
be considered as if it had not been done at all; although the legislator may have
only made the prohibition in general terms, and did not expressly state that what
had been done should be considered void ....
12 THE CIVIL LAW 87 (S. Scott transl. 1973). See CHILEAN CIV. CODE art. 10: acts pro-
hibited by law are null and without validity, unless other effects than nullity are ex-
pressly provided in case of contravention. Article 18 of the Argentine Civil Code of
1869 adopted almost verbatim the provision of the Chilean Civil Code.
11. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, at 73. See Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of
1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 45 (1971).
12. See Barnebe v. Sauer, 18 La. Ann. 148 (1866); Van Hook v. Woodard-Walker
Land & Timber Corp., 49 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Kennedy v. Johnson
Lumber Co., 33 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); S. LITVINOFF & W. T2TE, supra note
3, at 187-88. Professors Litvinoff and Tte stress the importance of article 12 of the
Louisiana Civil Code while discussing the category of inexistent juridical acts within
the context of the theory of nullities.
13. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 140.
14. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 214; Succession of Arthur Bush, 222 So. 2d 642 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969).
15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3460.
16. Weill contends that though all laws of public order are imperative, not all the
imperative laws are made for the preservation of public order. He refers to the solem-
nities imposed by law to certain juridical acts as an example of a norm which cannot
be altered by the parties' will and yet does not affect the public order. A. WEILL,
supra note 6, at 107. This rationale is based upon the premise that those solemnities
are exclusively designed to protect the interest of the parties to the transaction;
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preservation of public order or good morals.""
Article 12 of the Louisiana Civil Code has been a helpful rule of
interpretation in determining the nullity of a juridical act through
the imperative and negative formula of a statutory text. 8 Yet analysis
of textual language as the key to determining the relative or absolute
nature of the nullity cannot be carried too far. Any methodology for
characterizing the type of nullity must include an examination of the
interest that the sanction of nullity is designed to protect. Nullities
designed to protect purely private interests are relative nullities,
while those established to preserve public order or good morals are
absolute nullities.'" Therefore, the prohibitory formula of the legis-
lative text does not necessarily entail the sanction of absolute nullity.
The violation of prohibitory laws like the ones prescribing that the
succession of a living person cannot be sold"0 or that one cannot re-
nounce a prescription not yet acquired" is sanctioned with absolute
nullity, not because of the formula of the text, but because those
kinds of legal transactions affect a matter of public order. If an
emancipated minor who has only the power of administration sells or
encumbers any of his immovable property without the required author-
ization of the court, the act will be subject to a relative nullity even
though it is done in contravention of a prohibitory law.2 It follows
that not every prohibitory law involves a matter of public order
and, consequently, imperative and prohibitory laws cannot be con-
sidered as equivalents. A more accurate analogy can be drawn be-
however, the modern role played by formalities required ad validitatem is the protec-
tion of third persons. For example, when article 3305 of the Louisiana Civil Code com-
mands that a mortgage be in writing, the imperative character of the text is given by
legislator's will to promote stability of titles, a matter which no doubt concerns public
order. A statute which cannot be set aside by the will of the parties amounts to an in-
trusion into the parties' freedom to contract, and the only justification for such an in-
fringement is the preservation of public order. Consequently, a statute can be
classified as imperative only and insofar as it involves a matter of public order.
17. It follows that a prohibitory law does not necessary entail an absolute nullity.
Article 12 speaks of nullity as a sanction and its relative or absolute character will be
determined according to whether the noncompliance with the legal requirement affects
the public order.
18. See Symposium- Contractual Incapacity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 47 TUL.
L. REv. 1085, 1119 (1973).
19. See S. LITVINOFF & W. TETE, supra note 3, at 166-168; Symposium, supra note
18, at 1130.
20. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1887 & 2454.
21. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3460.
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 373. Since the nullity of the transaction is established to
protect the interests of the minor, such a protection is accomplished by giving the pro-
tected party the choice of ratifying the act or demand its annulment. To consider the
act absolutely null, and therefore not susceptible of confirmation, would punish rather
than protect the minor. See Symposium, supra note 18, at 1089.
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tween the notion of imperative law and absolute nullity, for in both
cases the interpreter must examine extraneous factors like the
ethical, political, social, and economic values that the statute or the
sanction of nullity is supposed to protect. 8
The Civil Code contains numerous provisions which operate only
in the absence of the declared or ascertainable will of the parties,
and the point has been raised as to whether such provisions should
have any place in legislation.2" Strictly speaking, the notion of sup-
pletive laws -or laws from which the parties may derogate at will -
seems difficult to reconcile with the notion of the obligatory force of
laws.25 However, a functional approach indicates that the inclusion of
suppletive statutes is justified. The mere existence of such provi-
sions in no way restricts the autonomy of the will, while on the
other hand they materially aid individuals by supplying a system of
generally accepted and approved rules and principles to regulate
legal relations.
CODIFICATION TECHNIQUE
Professor Rend David has pointed out that the line drawn between
imperative and suppletive laws has been confined to the province of
private law, and that no such classification is sponsored by droit
public writers who, whenever they discuss the subject, simply make
a blunt statement that all rules of public law are imperative." While
wondering why the common law world has failed to elaborate on
23. See F. G9NY, METHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF §
175, at 424 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1963). Because of the relativity and vagueness at-
tached to the notion of public order, the Civil Code does not include a list of impera-
tive laws nor a list of absolute nullities.
24. Rousset looked upon suppletive texts as an invasion on the parties' freedom to
contract and advocated a code entirely composed of imperative rules, while all sup-
pletive provisions were to be relegated to comments. See Rousset, De la lettre des
lois, ou de la codification, et de la rddaction rationnelles des lois, 9 REV. CRITIQUE DE
LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 324 (1856).
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 9. See generally Morrison, supra note 7, at 546. Tradi-
tional civilian doctrine refers to imperative and suppletive laws while classifying legal
norms according to their "obligatory force." In this regard, it has been pointed out
that this terminology is inaccurate insofar as it implies that suppletive texts are less
obligatory than imperative ones. See 1 H. & L. MAZEAUD, LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL § 67,
at 94 (1955). The observation is correct, since the difference between both kinds of
laws lies in the scope of their application and not in their intrinsic obligatory force.
Both types of norms bind the parties in the same way, although the parties are free to
agree that certain suppletive laws will not apply to them. Suppletive laws operate only
in the absence of the declared or ascertainable will of the parties, and once that gap
has been left, either consciously or unconsciously, the suppletive norm becomes as'
obligatory as any other legal rule. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 402 (3d ed.
1970).
26. See David, supra note 5, at 158.
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this doctrinal distinction, Professor David suggests the possibility
that in view of the fact that only private law has been codified in
France, the classification of laws between imperative and suppletive
may be tied up with the phenomenon of codification." This is an
interesting suggestion if it is considered that the movement for codi-
fication in civil law countries was inspired by a desire to break de-
finitively with the past, and that a Code, in order to do away with
the past, must be comprehensive. 8 The necessity of including a
large number of suppletive rules in a civil code, therefore, is closely
related to that element of comprehensiveness which every civil code
is supposed to have. It becomes apparent then, that in order to har-
monize the principle of autonomy of the will with the necessity of
covering any conceivable fact situation, a civil code must contain a
set of norms designed to be applied in case the parties have not pro-
vided their own rules. It involves the problem of inserting in a code
of laws legal provisions to cover contingencies that have arisen in
the course of performing the obligations and which were not thought
of, and consequently were not provided for at all either consciously
or unconsciously.'
The distinction between imperative and suppletive laws is but
an aspect of the idea that public interest is supreme and cannot be
set aside by a private agreement: jus publicum privatorum pactis
mutari non potest. Demarcation between the two kinds of laws
becomes clear when it is examined in the light of concrete
27. Id. at 159.
28. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, at 41.
29. One of the problems arising from the comprehensive character of a Civil Code
is the one related to the classification of contracts as nominate and innominate, a
distinction which has been at times confused with the problem of imperative and sup-
pletive rules. Nominate contracts are those which are subject to a special regulation
contained in the Civil Code (e.g., sale, lease, partnership, etc.), whereas innominate con-
tracts are those which, athough subject to the general principles of conventional
obligations, are not subject to a special regulation under the Civil Code. See LA. CIv.
CODE arts. 1777-78. The practical importance of this classification is reflected in" article
1764 of the Louisiana Civil code, which distinguishes between essential, natural, and
accidental contractual elements. Essential elements are those without which there is
either no contract at all or a contract of another description. Thus, capacity of the con-
tracting parties and their consent legally given are essential elements of every con-
tract, LA. Civ. CODE art. 1779, while the price and the transfer of ownership of the
thing sold are essential elements of the nominate contract of sale. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2439. Natural elements of a contract are those provided by law but which the parties
may modify or renounce without affecting the nominate character of the contract. An
onerous mandate, for example, is nonetheless a mandate because it is of the nature and
not of the essence of a mandate to be gratuitous. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2991. Finally,
accidential elements are those provided by the parties in their agreement and not
found in the particular part of the Code dealing with nominate contracts. LA. CiV.
CODE art. 1764(A)(3).
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agreements between individuals, rather than in the light of the no-
tion of public order, a concept which defies definition. The distinc-
tion reduces itself to a simple question: Can the parties, on their
own initiative, set aside the application of a particular rule of law
and submit their legal relationships to the operation of such other
rules as they may agree upon? Laws relating to the capacity of persons,
the regime of property rights, the protection of third persons, or the
protection of one of the contracting parties against the other are
inspired by a general interest which would be adversely affected if
private agreements were allowed to circumvent their application.
Thus, prospective spouses cannot set aside the application of a rule
imposing a minimum age to marry;"° parties may not take property
out of commerce by declaring it to be inalienable nor create a
usufruct of unlimited duration;31 a debtor cannot agree to confer a
general privilege unless it is expressly granted by law; 2 a purchaser
cannot renounce in advance the right to demand the rescission of
the sale on account of lesion;3 3 and one cannot renounce a prescrip-
tion not yet acquired.3" On the other hand, the parties to a contract
can stipulate that an obligation shall be performed at the place of
their choice, 5 that the expenses attached to the performance shall
be borne by the obligee,"o that the sale shall not be subject to any
warranty, 7 that the surety shall not have the benefit of discussion, 8
and that the lessee shall not have the right to sublease."
The problem of distinguishing between imperative and supple-
tive rules can be analyzed from another standpoint. Instead of attack-
ing the problem from the top, trying to determine the character of a
particular provision, more light would be cast if attention is focused
on the particular clause of the agreement which does away with a
rule of law, and the question is asked whether the enforcement of
the clause would be against public policy." Thus, by contrasting a
contractual clause whereby it is stated that the expenses of the act
of sale shall be paid by the seller with article 2466 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which attributes that obligation to the buyer, the sup-
pletive nature of this code article can be easily determined by veri-
30. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 92.
31. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 535 & 607-09.
32. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3185.
33. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2589.
34. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3460.
35. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 2157.
36. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2158.
37. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2503.
38. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 3045.
39. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2725.
40. See David, supra note 5, at 157.
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fying that the enforceability of such a contractual clause is not
against the public interest.
It has been said that it is the legislator's task to furnish a uni-
form criterion for the identification of imperative and suppletive
texts." However, as it will be shown, the redactors of the Louisiana
Civil Code, as well as of the Code Napoleon, rarely have fulfilled this
task. The determination of which are rules of public order and which
are merely supplementary of the parties' will is a difficult question,
and physical limitations of time and space discourage any attempt to
list exhaustively the laws of public order or good morals that are to
be found in the Louisiana Civil Code. This difficulty notwithstand-
ing, and in view of the numerous revision projects of the Louisiana
Civil Code that are being undertaken currently, it seems appro-
priate to examine in a cursory review which method, if any, the
Code provides for the identification of "laws made for the preserva-
tion of public order or good morals."
Assuming that the redactors of the Code have adopted a cri-
terion of distinction, the question arises as to whether such a technique
has been followed invariably and thus is a safe guide in the inter-
pretation of the Code. Last but not least, it would be worthwhile to
determine whether this technique has proved efficacious enough to
justify its adoption in current revision projects of the Louisiana
Civil Code.
A distinction should be drawn between the technique of fragmen-
tary legislation and that of codification, each presenting specific
peculiarities and involving different considerations.'2 In this regard,
it should be remembered that Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction and
that it is the intention of its main law-formulating agency to follow
the civilian legislative technique in the Civil Code revision projects.'"
It seems therefore appropriate to survey the way in which the
French Civil Code, as well as two modern codes, have met the prob-
lem under consideration and which contributions they have to offer
to its solution.
THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE
The only article in the Code Napoleon similar to Louisiana Civil
Code article 11 is article 6: "Individuals cannot by their conventions
41. F. GNY, supra note 23, § 175, at 424.
42. See F. G~ny, The Legislative Technique of Modern Civil Codes, in 9 THE
SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 498 & 505 (1921). This English translation belongs to "The
Modern Legal Philososphy Series" and was taken from G~ny's essay La technique
legislative dans la codification civile moderne, in 2 LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE DU CODE CIVIL
FRANCAIS 994 (1904).




derogate from the force of laws made for the preservation of public
order and good morals." The second paragraph of Louisiana Civil
Code article 11 has no French counterpart and was added in 1825
"due to excess caution.""
In view of the great similarity of the two codes in spirit and ter-
minology, it seems that if any consistent method were followed in
indicating the difference between imperative and suppletive texts,
that method should be identical in both codes. 5
There are many indications pointing to the use of a rigorous
technique on the part of the redactors of the Code civil in differen-
tiating between imperative and suppletive texts. The imperative or
suppletive character of the French Civil Code provisions, it was
said, turned on the structure of the formulae. The presence in the
formulae of a prohibition (ne peut or its equivalent) or of the
future verb (replacing the imperative) would invariably indicate the
imperative or mandatory nature of the text, while the use of the
present indicative or any other verb form, not coupled with a nega-
tive, would signal a suppletive text. This conclusion is reinforced by
a passage from the discussions before the French General Assembly
during the deliberations preliminary to the adoption of Code Napo-
leon:
The Conseil d'etat has ordered that in the redaction of the Code,
the future must always be employed. Why? Because in French
the future replaces the imperative, and consequently lends itself
well to the redaction of laws which are made to command or pro-
hibit ... .
It is only within the last few years that the redactors of our laws
have adopted the present indicative, which undoubtedly appears
to them more solemn, shorter, more elegant; but which is really
not very exact. The law ought not to say: this thing is, when it
is not-when the very law has for its object to order that such a
thing shall be henceforth and for the future. There is certainly a
distinction to make, and the projet of the law which we are
discussing offers an example of it. Some of its articles are imper-
ative; and those are all composed in the future. The others are
in the present tense, because they are only enunciative, and
because they only have to declare principles already known; to
express rules of right or of morals."
44. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, at 74.
45. See Morrison, supra note 15, at 550.
46. See 6 P. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL
52, 55 (1827).
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The early French commentators adopted this criterion in inter-
preting the French Code, and the jurisprudence also applied it in
the decision of cases coming within imperative or mandatory texts.4'
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a French Court of Appeals
held that under article 228 of the Code Napoleon, the second marri-
age of a woman who re-married before the expiration of the ten-
month period subsequent to the dissolution of her former marriage
was null because of the ne peut contained in the text of the article.48
A closer examination of the texts, however, casts doubt on
whether as a matter of fact the redactors actually employed the
rigorous and methodical technique imputed to them by the early
commentators and suggested by the statement of the redactors or
the Conseil d'etat. There are certain articles which absolutely deny
the existence of any rigorous technique on the part of the drafters.
As indicated, early French doctrine and jurisprudence declared as
void those marriages coming within the terms of article 228 of the
Code Napoleon, for it was said that the insertion of the ne peut indi-
cated that those marriages were celebrated in contravention of an
imperative law. Yet, the section of the French Civil Code referring
to the nullity of marriages'9 does not set this out as a cause of nullity,
and the penalty seemed unreasonably harsh in view of the purely
temporary and cautionary nature of the prohibition. Thus, the Cour
de Cassation departed from the doctrine and prior decisions, holding
that "it is not enough that a provision of the Civil Code be couched
in prohibitive terms for its violation to carry with it nullity . . .. I
Modern French doctrine has recognized that the Code Napoleon
did not employ so methodical, rigorous, and precise a classification
between imperative and suppletive texts as formerly imputed to it.5'
It will be seen that because of the changeable nature of notions such
47. 1 C. DELVINCOURT, INSTITUTES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 291 (2d ed. 1879); 11 P.
MERLIN, REPERTOIRE UNIVERSAL ET RAISONNE DE JURISPRUDENCE, V. °NULLITE 642 (1827);
1 J. PROUDHON, COURS DE DROIT FRANCAIS 231 (1803).
48. S.2.2.141, COUR D'APPEL DE TREVES, April 30, 1806. Article 228 of the Code
Napoleon read (before the amendments of 1919, 1928, and 1975): "La femme ne peut
contracter un noveau mariage qu'apr~s dix mois rdvolus depuis la dissolution du
mariage precedent." (Emphasis added.) See LA. CIV. CODE art. 137 (repealed by 1970
La. Acts, No. 108). It should be noted that the French Court of Appeals looked upon
the negative command [ne peut] of the statute in order to determine its imperative
character. As stated before, this would be a "prohibitive" law but not necessarily an
"imperative" one.
49. FRENCH CIV. CODE arts. 180-202; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 110-18.
50. Verch~re c. hdritiers Verch~re, S.3.1.415, October 29, 1811.
51. See A. ANGELESCO, LA TECHNIQUE LtGISLATIVE EN MATIPERE DE CODIFICATION
CIVILE. ETUDE DE DROIT COMPARt 583 (1930); B. STARCK, supra note 6, at 23.
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as "good morals" or "public order," this classification has been left
to judicial discretion and doctrine.2
THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
With regard to the legislative technique employed by the Lou-
isiana Civil Code, it seems very unlikely that the Louisiana redactors
introduced any substantial variation from the French model. It is
true that the question whether the redactors of the 1808 Code
adopted French or Spanish substantive law has been debated hotly.53
But, beyond the scope of this well-known dispute is the great simi-
larity of the French and Louisiana Codes in spirit and terminology,
and the fact that they were both drafted in the same language and
were drawn up, at least in part, under the same juridical influences.
It appears, then, according to early French doctrine and juris-
prudence, that the imperative or suppletive character of the texts of
the Louisiana Civil Code would turn on the structure of the for-
mulae, especially if it is borne in mind that the Louisiana Codes of
1808 and 1825 were first written in French and then translated into
English. In this connection, it is important to notice that the "shall"
form of the verb, which is also employed as the imperative in
English when used with the third person, has been used thoroughly
in translation, even though it is not the natural translation of the
French third person future.'
Early Louisiana cases have applied this hermeneutical technique
in the decision of cases involving the applicaton of imperative
norms. Thus, a Louisiana court held that a clause in a marriage contract
providing for the donation of immovable property "on the express
condition that should she . . . in any manner or form be separated
from him as her husband" the property should revert to the husband
was void when it was sought to be enforced after the wife obtained
a divorce on the ground of her husband's adultery. Emphasizing the
presence of the future verb in article 152 of the Code of 1825 (article
156 of 1870),11 the court held that such an article "is a law eminently
52. See F. G9NY, supra note 23, § 175, at 424.
53. See Batiza, supra note 11; Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to
Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972); Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over
the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1972); Batiza, Sources of
the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV. 628 (1972).
54. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 552.
55. LA. CiV. CODE art. 156: "In case of separation ... the party against whom it
shall have been pronounced, shall lose all the advantages or donations, the other party
may have conferred by the marriage contract ... and the party at whose instance the
separation has been obtained, shall preserve all those to which such party would have
been entitled .... " (Emphasis added.)
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conducive to public order and good morals, and would be null accord-
ing to article 11 of the Code."5 Likewise, a Louisiana court decided
that under article 134 of the Louisiana Code of 1825 (article 137 of
1870),51 the second marriage of a woman who remarried before the
expiration of the ten-month period subsequent to the dissolution of
her former marriage was null because of the "shall not" contained in
the formula. The court said: "So long as the legislature think proper
to continue in force these prohibitory laws . . . it is the duty of
courts to see that those protecting laws shall not be violated, either
directly or indirectly.""
Interestingly enough, subsequent decisions overruled this juris-
prudence; it became settled law that marriages entered in violation
of article 137 were not null, despite the use of the "shall" form of
the verb.59 In a similar way, the Louisiana jurisprudence established
that although article 1611 is a prohibitory law and even expressly
nullifies the subsequent marriage between the adulterers, unless
the petition specifically mentions the person with whom the adul-
tery is charged to have been committed, the nullity does not apply."'
Louisiana courts have found it necessary to take liberties in the
interpretation of legislative texts that are couched in a clear impera-
tive language. This may be illustrated by the interpretation placed
upon article 1533 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 (article 1546 of
1870). Article 1533 provided:
A donation made to a minor under the age of puberty must be
accepted by his tutor. A minor, arrived at the age of puberty,
56. Ledoux v. Her Husband, 10 La. Ann. 663 (1855).
57. Article 134 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 is the counterpart of article
228 of the Code Napoleon. It became article 137 of the Code of 1870 (repealed by 1970
La. Acts, No. 108), which read: "The wife shall not be at liberty to contract another
marriage, until ten months after the dissolution of her preceding marriage." (Emphasis
added.)
58. Gasquet v. Dimitry, 9 La. 592, 601 (1836). Compare the rationale of the Cour
de Cassation while dealing with a similar problem arising under article 228 of the
French Civil Code. See text at note 50, supra. Here again, the court spoke of "pro-
hibitory" laws and not of "imperative" laws, so that the nullity of the second marriage
was not grounded on present article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code but on article 12,
which establishes the implicit nullity of a juridical act contravening a prohibitory law.
59. See State v. Stevenson, 115 La. 777, 40 So. 44 (1906); Succession of Benton,
106 La. 494, 31 So. 123 (1901).
60. Article 161 was repealed by Act 625 of 1972.
61. See Rhodes v. Miller, 189 La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938); Succession of Hernandez,
46 La. Ann. 962 (1894). LA. CiV. CODE art. 161 (repealed by 1972 La. Acts, No. 625)
read: "In case of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty party can never contract
matrimony with his.or her accomplice in adultery, under the penalty of being con-
sidered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the penalty of
nullity of the new marriage."
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but not emancipated, must accept it under the authorization or
with the concurrence of his curator. 2
A Louisiana court held that the acceptance of a donation by a
minor arrived at the age of puberty was valid without the authoriza-
tion or concurrence of his curator, as "this clause is not prohibitory
so as to impart a nullity, if contravened, nor is the pain of nullity
expressly declared.""3 In this article devra was translated as "must,"
and one can hardly imagine a stronger imperative than a "must"
phrase.64 Yet the court did not confine its task to a mere gram-
matical interpretation of the text.
It can be concluded then that the Louisiana Civil Code did not
employ a rigorous legislative technique in order to determine the
imperative or suppletive character of its texts. Assuming, arguendo,
that the Code adopted a criterion based on the structure of the for-
mulae, it has not been followed invariably nor can it be erected as a
safe guide in the interpretation of the Code.
THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE
The preliminary draft of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (B.G.B.)
elaborated a complicated and intricate technical mechanism for dif-
ferentiating between imperative and suppletive texts. German drafts-
men were obsessed with being complete, 5 and a part of this
thorough regulation of juridical life is reflected in the system of
stereotyped, practically invariable formulae devised by the first
committee for the redaction of the B.G.B. to differentiate imperative
and suppletive texts.
According to the method followed by the preliminary draft, im-
perative texts were designated by the use of the modals miissen
(third person singular muss) and kinnen nicht (third person singular
kann). The force of those terms would indicate the absolute value of
the Code article, based on considerations of public order or good
morals from which individuals do not have the power to derogate. 7
On the other hand, suppletive texts were indicated by the use of the
modal sollen (third person singular soil) or by the use of the present
indicative. A close examination of the texts of the B.G.B., however,
62. (Emphasis added.) Article 1533 of the Code of 1825 was altered in the Code of
1870. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 1546. The second paragraph was amended by Act 44 of
1966.
63. Duplessis v. Kennedy, 6 La. 231, 245 (1834).
64. Morrison, supra note 17, at 555.
65. F. GPNY, supra note 23, § 212, at 535.
66. See R. SALEILLES, Introduction d l'dtude du droit civil allemand, in 1
MELANGES DE DROIT COMPAR2 28 (1904).
67. See C. WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE xxii (1907).
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casts doubt as to whether its scientific codifiers consistently followed
this methodical technique. There are many articles in the B.G.B.
wherein the redactors included the phrases "unless there is a con-
trary agreement," "in the absence of contrary agreement," etc.,
even though the "imperative" modals k6nnen nicht or miissen were
included in their texts. It is true that the character of the provision
can be determined from the spirit and context of the rule, but it is
equally arguable that by breaking the consistency of the criterion,
the argumentum a contrario can be applied to make imperative
every text which does not carry the "unless" clause.
German doctrine has pointed out the difficulty in limiting with
accuracy the realm of imperative and suppletive laws, thus con-
ceding the failure of the first committee for the redaction of the
B.G.B. in attempting to devise a rigorous method to identify both
kinds of texts. 8 It was perhaps for this reason that the commission
for revision of the preliminary draft of the German Civil Code
stated in the exposd des motifs that "the Civil Code has abandoned
any attempt to specify all the imperative norms it contains." 9
THE SWISS CIVIL CODE
While the German codification boasts of its completeness and
the extent to which the discretion of the judge is restrained by legal
texts, the Swiss Code prides itself on its equally studied incom-
pleteness, leaving the details to be worked out by jurisprudence and
doctrine in accordance with the dynamic social conscience."0
Thus, the Swiss Civil Code, while recognizing the difference
between imperative and suppletive laws, attempts no rigorous and
detailed technical classification of the texts. The redactor stated in
the expos4 des motifs that he "reserves some latitude in failing to
mark, by a choice between different formulae, more or less syn-
onymous, for example between the auxiliary verb 'should' [soi4 doit]
and the future tense, an express distinction between prescriptions of
imperative law and those of suppletive law."'" The draftsman fur-
nished the following reasons:
It would scarcely be advantageous for the legislator to take
away, in this matter, all liberty of interpretation from the juris-
68. A. ANGELESCO, supra note 51, at 585: "The experience of the German
legislator sufficiently proves that the lawmaker cannot establish accurately, by the
structure of the formulae, the distinction between suppletive laws and the others."
69. 1 B.G.B. ExposJ des motifs 17 (1896).
70. See F. GENY, supra note 23, at 509.
71. See E. HUBER, EXPOSE DES MOTIFS DE L'AVANT-PROJET DU CODE CIVIL SUISSE 14
(1902).
102119811
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
prudence. It would be an error to formulate the law in such a
fashion that it would be impossible for the tribunals to follow
the evolution of ideas without a revision of the legislative text...
When the legislator intends to place an absolute, imperative
value on a provision he ought to say so. If he does not say so,
the question will be resolved in accordance with the spirit of the
epoch .
It can be concluded then, that in the Swiss Civil Code the deter-
mination of the imperative or suppletive character of the texts is
largely a matter for judicial discretion, inspired by the ideals and
exigencies of the period in which the texts are applied, unless their
character has been indicated expressly and unmistakably in the
text.73
REVISION PROJECTS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
The Style and Drafting Manual for the Civil Code revision indi-
cates that, at least in principle, the present tense and indicative
mood should be used to facilitate readability.74 However, while deal-
ing specifically with the structure of the articles in connection with
their imperative or suppletive character, the Manual indicates that
"shall" should be used if the provision is imperative and "may" if
the text is suppletive.15
No attempt will be made to consider all of the revision projects
of the Lousiana Civil Code, and physical limitations will make it
impossible to give more than illustrations of just a few of the revi-
sion projects and their possibilities and limitations of legislative
technique.
Obligations
The principle of autonomy of the will receives its strongest
application in the field of conventional obligations. For this reason
the texts of the Obligations Revision very seldom include a "not-
withstanding contrary agreement" clause. In fact, the freedom of
the parties has such an implicit strength that the comments and
reporter's messages to the draft articles rarely mention that the
parties may provide otherwise.
72. (Emphasis added.)
73. Sometimes the Swiss Civil Code establishes clauses "sauf convention con-
traire," but their use is not consistent throughout the code.
74. J. DAINOW, supra note 43, at F-2, rule 2.
75. Id. at F-3, rule 5. See LA. R.S. 1:3 (1950); Lazarus, Legislative Bill Drafting, 1
LA. STAT. ANN. lvii, lix (West 1973).
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In those rare instances in which the "unless" clause has been
included in the text, its inclusion has not been fortunate. Article 1 of
the section "Of Consent," for example, states in the last paragraph:
"Unless otherwise specified in the offer, there need not be confor-
mity between the manner in which the offer is made and the manner
in which the acceptance is made."" The use of the present indi-
cative, coupled with the principle of autonomy of the will which
permeates this section of the Code, would suffice to dispense with
the "unless" clause. A different problem would have been present
had the paragraph read "there shall need not be conformity . .. ."
Furthermore, the use of "shall" has been employed in texts wherein
it is obvious that the provision can be altered at the parties'
pleasure.77
The future form of the verb has been used rarely throughout
the Obligations Revision project; most of its provisions use the present
indicative or the "may" form. This can be explained because, as
stated before, the principle of autonomy of the will governs the
whole area of conventional obligations. 8
Property
Laws which determine property rights and their limits and
effects are too closely connected with the social organization of the
community to permit derogation by private agreement. The regime
of property, therefore-in contrast with the obligations regime-is
governed for the most part by mandatory or imperative rules of
law." In accordance with the principle of numerus clausus, parties
may not create real rights not allowed by law," nor may parties
take property out of commerce by declaring it inalienable.
76. LOUSIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, REVISION OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF
1870: BOOK III-OBLIGATIONS REVISION tit. IV, chapt. 2, § 2, art. 1. (S. Litvinoff rep.
1980).
77. Id. at chapt. 1, Section on "Performance in General," art. 9:
"In the absence of agreement or other indication of the parties' intent, perfor-
mance of an obligation to give an individually determined thing shall be rendered
at the place the thing was when the obligation arose. If the obligation is of any
other kind the performance shall be rendered at the domicile of the obligor.
78. Id. at Section "Of the Object and Matter of Contracts," art. 1: "Parties are
free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or
determinable."
79. A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 3, at 146.
80. Article 476 of the Lousiana Civil Code includes ownership, personal and
predial servitudes, and other real rights allowed by law as rights in things. After
reading the text of the article, one gets the impression that the legislator has adopted
the system of numerus clausus. However, comment (d) indicates that current French
and Louisiana jurisprudences favor a system of numerus apertus. Furthermore, com-
ment (a) states that the new article 476 does not change the law; therefore, the
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Most of the texts of the new Book II of the Civil Code are couched
in the present indicative. In spite of the fact that the majority of
these provisions are designed to be imperative, the "shall" is hardly
used. Here again, the Civil Code Drafting Manual's rule as to imper-
ative and suppletive laws has not been followed strictly.
There are many superfluous "unless otherwise provided by law"
but very few "notwithstanding contrary agreement" and "unless
otherwise provided" clauses. The absence of the latter type of
clause is easily understood if it is remembered that in this matter
"public order" is the rule and "autonomy of the will" the exception.
It should be noted that the drafters have not been consistent in
the use of the "unless" clauses. For instance, article 507 of the Civil
Code, dealing with the consequence of accession in relation to
movables, specifically provides that the following code articles are
to be applied "[iln the absence of other provisions of law or
contract." On the other hand, article 469 provides that the transfer
or encumbrance of an immovable includes its component parts with-
out indicating that the parties to the transaction may provide other-
wise. The lack of consistency may be explained easily. The "unless"
clause (rectius: "in the absence" clause) in article 507 became
necessary to indicate that the exceptional rule (i.e., freedom of the
parties) is to be applied in that particular section. On the other
hand, the use of the present indicative and not of the "shall" in arti-
cle 469 determines the suppletive character of the text. The problem
is that there are many other provisions that, though couched in the
present indicative, are not meant to be suppletive. Although the
character of the provision may be determined by its spirit and con-
text, the argumentum a contrario may still be raised. Be this as it
may, it is obvious that the drafters did not intend to use a rigor-
ous, precise technique aiming at classifying imperative and sup-
pletive rules according to the structure of the formulae.
Matrimonial Regimes
The revised matrimonial regimes law under Act 709 of 1979 has
been inserted at the beginning of the provisions pertaining to
nominate contracts. The location appears sensible, because Act 709
regulates the patrimonial effects of marriage, which may be
derogated from by contract, whereas the Civil Code articles which
.comments seem to allow the parties to a contract to create real rights "apart and
beyond" those allowed by law, whereas the text of the article seems to preclude that
possibility.
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appear in Chapter Five of Book One regulate the personal effects of
marriage, which may not be altered by agreement of the parties."
Even though the location of the articles on matrimonial regimes
emphasizes the ability of the spouses to regulate their matrimonial
property according to an express contract, the redactors inserted
specific provisions in the introductory chapter of Title Four stating
the limits of contractual freedom."2 That explains the rare use of
"unless otherwise agreed" clauses.
It is worthwhile to point out that in certain instances the
drafters have considered that some situations are of such delicacy as
to warrant an express provision indicating the parties' freedom to
renounce rights conferred by the law. 3 In this way the legislator
expressly stated that the spouses' right to concur in those specific
acts is of a suppletive nature.
Partnership
The new articles on partnership incorporated irito the Civil Code
by Act 150 of 1980 include imperative as well as suppletive provi-
sions. Insofar as a partnership is a contract, the general rules on
conventional obligations apply to the contract of partnership to the
extent that those provisions can be reconciled with those pertaining
to the nominate contract of partnership.84 One may therefore assume
that the parties to a partnership contract enjoy an almost unre-
strained freedom to regulate their affairs in the same way as in any
other contract. However, this is not so, because the contract of part-
nership engenders a juridical person distinct from its partners,85 and
81. See generally Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited. 1979
Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, .40 LA. L. REV. 83,
86-87 (1979).
82. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330:
Spouses may not by agreement before or during marriage, renounce or alter
the marital portion or the established orddr of succession. Nor may the spouses
limit with respect to third persons the right that one spouse alone has under the
legal regime to obligate the community or to alienate, encumber, or lease com-
munity property.
83. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2348:
A spouse may expressly renounce the right to concur in the alienation, encum-
brance, or lease of a community immovable or all or substantially all of a com-
munity enterprise. He also may renounce the right to participate in the management
of a community enterprise. The renunciation may be irrevocable for a stated
term.
84. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2802: "The contract of partnership is governed by the pro-
visions in the Title: Of Conventional Obligations, in all matters that are not otherwise
provided for by this Title."
85. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2801:
A partnership is a juridical person, distinct from its partners, created by a
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it becomes a matter of public order that third persons be aware
when they are dealing with a partner and when they are dealing
with the partnership in its capacity as such. For this reason, the
Advisory Committee on Partnership deemed it appropriate to enter
a caveat in comment (b) to article 2802, its main purpose being to
alert the interpreter that the drafters did not intend to distinguish
imperative and suppletive provisions on the basis of sacramental for-
mulae."
In the first place, it must be pointed out that this revision pro-
ject did not resort to the "shall" and "may" as verb forms distin-
guishing between imperative and suppletive rules. In fact, the
"shall" form of the verb hardly has been used. As stated in comment
(b) to article 2802, the drafters started from the premise that
"courts ultimately determine which matters involve public policy,"
without attempting to indicate on an article-by-article basis which
norms are to be considered of public order. 7 Similarly, although the
suppletive character of several texts has been signaled by an
"unless the partners have agreed otherwise" clause,88 the redactors
have emphasized that the absence of such a clause does not
necessarily indicate the imperative character of the provision.8
In one isolated instance, dealing with the right of a partner to
obtain information, the lawmaker underscored the mandatory nature
contract between two or more persons to combine their efforts or resources in
determined proportions and to collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit
or commercial benefit. Trustees and succession representatives, in their capacities
as such, and unincorporated associations may be partners.
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2802, comment (b):
The provisions of Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 are generally suppletive, that is, in
accordance with the principle of Article 11, the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, par-
ties may depart from the provisions of these chapters that do not concern matters
of public policy. Nevertheless, provisions such as contained ... in Article 2813 ...
deal with matters involving the public order and should therefore be construed as
mandatory rather than suppletive. In some instances provisions may not be
departed from not because they are 'mandatory' but because they are 'essential'
as the proper legal frame for a particular situation. Article 1764 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 contemplates such 'essential' stipulations or provisions. ...
Article 2801 is an example of a provision of which no departure is possible
because it is essential. The suppletive nature of a provision is at times indicated
by the expression 'unless otherwise agreed' or other words to the same effect, but
the absence of such wording does not necessarily indicate that the provision in
question is mandatory or is not suppletive. Courts ultimately determine which
matters involve public policy. It is clear that provisions concerning ownership of
immovable property and protection of the interests of third parties are matters of
public policy. See for example Arts. 2806, 2833 and the provisions of Chapters 3
and 7.
87. Id.
88. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2803-04, 2806, 2820, 2824, 2825, 2827, and 2834.
89. See note 61, supra.
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of the rule by attaching the sanction of nullity to any agreement
designed to preclude the partner's right to inform himself reason-
ably of the business activities of the partnership. 0 In most cases, the
drafters' comments or the very nature of the provision will furnish
sufficient guidelines to be considered by the judge in determining
the character of the text." This has been, after all, the technique
employed throughout the Louisiana Civil Code, whereby its drafters
did not consider it necessary to indicate expressly on a case-by-case
basis that the public order overrides individual interests.
Mortgage of Movables Used in Commercial or Industrial Activity
Although this Act has not been included in the Civil Code but in
the-Louisiana Revised Statutes,92 its provisions have been phrased
pursuant to rule 5 of the Civil Code Revision Style and Drafting
Manual. The Act on mortgage of movables used in commercial or in-
dustrial activity is, no doubt, a rara avis among other revision pro-
jects, insofar as it consistently employs the "shall" and "may" to
indicate, respectively, imperative and suppletive texts. The subject
matter regulated by this act concerns the real right of mortgage in
certain corporeal movables, so that the "shall" form of the verb
abounds. The act permits the encumbrance of certain corporeal
movables, together with the encumbrance of the land or lease upon
which they are located. The property so encumbered is subject to
the registry and procedural rules regulating the mortgage of the im-
movable or lease with which the movables are encumbered. The Act
allows the separate mortgaging of the movables as a chattel mort-
gage, but once the parties decide to follow the scheme provided by
the Act, they are bound to comply with all the formal requirements
imposed by the statute. The autonomy of the will plays an insignifi-
cant role in this matter, and the legal effects which follow the grant-
ing of the mortgage are imperatively applicable. The protection of
90. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2813:
A partner may inform himself of the business activities of the partnership and
may consult its books and records, even if he has been excluded from manage-
ment. A contrary agreement is null. He may not exercise his right in a manner
that unduly interferes with the operations of the partnership or prevents other
partners from exercising their rights in this regard.
91. Even though neither the ezposd des motifs nor the comments are law, they
constitute helpful guidelines to assert the mens legislatoris. Many of the new articles
on partnership are accompanied by comments wherein the drafters indicate what has
not been expressly stated in the text, namely, that the parties may provide otherwise.
These comments ate mere persuasive sources to be taken into account by the inter-
preter, and they do not preclude the judge from considering other factors which even-
tually may lead him to construe the statute in a different way than the legislator
himself.
92. LA. R.S. 9:5367-72 (Supp. 1980).
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third parties who might deal with the encumbered property is the
public policy issue which has prompted the legislator to employ
"shall" throughout the entire Act. This uniform technique leaves no
room for doubt as to whether a text is imperative or suppletive.
It becomes apparent that of the few civil codes and revision pro-
jects considered, only this particular project methodically employed
a rigorous technique for the textual distinction between imperative
and suppletive texts. The small number of provisions it contains and
the revision undertaken by the Semantics Committee of the Louis-
iana State Law Institute have contributed the desired consistency.
The elegance conferred by the use of the present indicative has
been sacrificed for the sake of clarity and therefore replaced by the
monotony and heaviness of the words "shall" and "may."
TENTATIVE APPROACH
The evaluation of different techniques poses a question: Should
the legislator employ the technique of determining in detail the
imperative or suppletive character of each article's text, or should
the legislator be content with fixing inflexibly only those rules
which, because of their connotations of public order, warrant an ex-
press declaration to that effect? The second alternative seems
preferable for the following reasons.
Modern legislative technique postulates the insufficiency of
codified law and recognizes that legislation is incapable of foreseeing
and regulating in advance all of the complex relations of man in
society. This has been acknowledged in the preface of the Style and
Drafting Manual for the Civil Code Revision: "[A civil code]... con-
tains general as well as specific rules, but the latter are included
only to implement the general legal principles."" It recognizes that
codification is essentially static and that the phenomena to which it
must be applied are essentially dynamic. The task, then, of a modern
codification technique becomes that of reconciling the conflicting
nature of the stable legislative law and the changing social cir-
cumstances. The casuistical technique so much employed in common
law jurisdictions has proved unsatisfactory when applied to a civil
code, for the latter is supposed to cope with the changes of a
gradual evolutionary character without being able to rely on case
law to the extent that common law jurisdictions do. Thus for-
mulated, the problem of the suppletive and imperative character of
the texts should be addressed in light of the correlative impossibili-
ty (or futility) of delimiting through the structure of the formulae
the imperative or suppletive character of every code article.
93. J. DAINOW, supra note 43, at F-1.
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Attempts to define "public order" have been a complete failure.,'
Considerations of fluidity and flexibility apply with particular force
to concepts as variable as "good morals" and "public policy," which
are totally dependent on the social conscience of the time and place
and demonstrate a continuous and progressive fluctuation. It follows
that the legislator should not employ a technique which will result
in making it impossible for the texts to evolve with the social con-
science by binding the discretion of the judge within narrow limits,
thus attempting to fix inflexibly the suppletive or imperative char-
acter value of every provision. The experience of the past is illus-
trative in this respect. It has been shown by the way in which
French, as well as Louisiana, courts have declared the suppletive
character of many provisions which attempted to place the judge on
a statutory bed of Procrustes.
These reflections are not aimed at leaving the judge entirely
free, since he still must be guided by article 11 of the Civil Code and
the notions of public order and good morals; but these concepts
receive new content from the dynamic social conscience. 5 Further-
more, the legislator is free to state expressly the legislative sanction
attached to those few provisions which parties may not alter at
their pleasure whenever the situation is of such delicacy as to war-
rant an express statement.
CONCLUSIONS
The distinction between imperative and suppletive texts based
upon the structure of the formulae is useless unless applied con-
sistently and universally. Most of the codes and revision projects
that have been considered fail to provide a rigorous method of dis-
tinguishing both types of provisions.
When the legislator attempts to carry the differentiation in
every article of the code, this technique brings with it a certain ines-
capable artificiality and forcefulness, besides inevitably raising
94. See F. G9NY, supra note 23, § 175, at 423. After confessing that attempts to
define ordre public have been a complete failure, G~ny points out the cardinal impor-
tance of determining which are the legal rules inspired by a superior social interest
and therefore not susceptible of free regulation. He concludes that in determining the
notion of public order, the interpreter must direct his search toward sociological
elements of all kinds which are the moving forces in the situations submitted for his
decision. G~ny states: "How else can this inquiry be conducted if not through an in-
vestigation of our moral nature, a scrutiny of the principles of our political organiza-
tion, penetration of the needs of our economic order, so as to find out the superior
rules which express the conditions vital for our society at the present time, and which




doubt as to almost every text: Is this the isolated instance in which
the legislator made a mistake? If the text does not specifically state
"unless otherwise agreed," does it meant that the provision is
necessarily imperative? If the text does not include the phrase "not-
withstanding a contrary agreement," does it mean that the provi-
sion is necessarily suppletive?
Imperative texts should employ, as far as possible, the "shall"
form of the verb and should state expressly the legislative sanction
attached (e.g., "a contrary agreement is null").
Other than the preceding, no textual distinction should be made
between suppletive and imperative texts; their value should be
determined and their application should be made by the judge in
accordance with the spirit of the epoch and the exigencies of the
situation.
The drafters may nevertheless indicate in the comments the im-
perative or suppletive character of the provision. The comment will
form an element to be considered by the judge in determining the
character of the rule, but it is not to be binding upon him nor to
preclude him from taking into account the contemporary social con-
science while reaching his conclusion.
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